


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## STAFF NOTES:

# Soviet Union Eastern Europe

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January 2, 1975  
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**SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE**

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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USA Institute Officials Renew  
Criticism of "Schlesinger Doctrine"

Two officials of the USA Institute in Moscow told US embassy officers late last week that Soviet objections to the "Schlesinger Doctrine" on targeting are unaffected by the Vladivostok accord.

M. A. Milshtein, chief of the strategic studies department at the institute, and L. S. Semeyko, his deputy, asserted that the doctrine is unacceptable because it gives a national leader a choice of various modes of nuclear attack and thus makes nuclear war an option. They said the stress in the doctrine on the importance of missile accuracy implies an attempt to acquire a first-strike capability. Both men argued that the "race for accuracy" should be controlled, and Semeyko suggested the possibility of limiting the number of tests of new systems "perhaps to 10 to 15."

Both also mentioned, as they had in a recent article, that once the nuclear threshold is crossed, it would be impossible for the side under attack to determine within the time at its disposal whether the attack is limited or full scale. Milshtein said that he could be comfortable with the doctrine only if both sides agreed to "rules of the game," which he implied would govern the steps in escalation to full war. He quickly added, however, that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to agree to such "rules."

Milshtein said that the Soviets would never make a nuclear first strike and that as a matter of policy all Soviet missiles are aimed at military targets. Semeyko seconded this, but added that the term "military targets" was not defined in a narrow sense.

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Another USA Institute official, foreign policy department chief G. A. Trofimenko, had expressed a somewhat different attitude toward the "Schlesinger Doctrine" in early December, also during a conversation with US embassy officers. Trofimenko had said that provision for such a large number of warheads in the Vladivostok agreement had reduced the importance of the main Soviet argument against the "Schlesinger Doctrine," the danger that in establishing the need for more targets it would also create a need for more warheads. The Soviet attitude toward the doctrine "would still be negative," he had contended, but the terms of the Vladivostok agreement meant that the Soviet side could move to a similar strategy.

Milshtein and Semeyko revealed considerable interest in, and expertise on, Chinese strategic affairs. Semeyko repeatedly noted that the Chinese threat must be taken into account in any Soviet discussion of arms reduction. Milshtein alluded to the dilemma faced by the USSR in seeking to maintain an "assured destruction" capability against China. He said McNamara's "assured destruction" doctrine was effective when at least 25 percent of a nation's population and 50 percent of its industrial complex could be destroyed, but for China a 25 percent population loss might be viewed as an incentive, not a deterrent to attack.

Milshtein, a retired lieutenant general and onetime dean of faculty at the General Staff Academy who apparently still moves in high military circles, also said that the harder line on the troubles in Western society taken recently by Soviet military publications was to be expected. One could not preach uninterrupted peace and harmony, he said, and expect military vigilance and combat readiness to remain at acceptable levels. He added, however, that the Soviet military has never spoken out

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against any agreement reached by the government,  
and has kept its personnel aware of the process of  
detente. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACK-  
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Soviet Oil Supplies to Eastern  
Europe To Increase in 1975

Moscow will deliver an estimated 1.2 million barrels per day of crude oil to Eastern Europe this year--some 5 percent more than in 1974. The price of the crude is the same as in 1971-74, about \$2.50 per barrel. Soviet deliveries will account for about four fifths of Eastern Europe's imports, the same as in the past several years.

An official of the Soviet foreign trade company Soyuzneftexport reported that an agreement has already been signed with East Germany and that negotiations with Bulgaria were to take place last week and with Poland at a later date. Romania may also be seeking Soviet crude oil to help ease the burden of high prices paid for Middle East crude.

In mid-December the Hungarian foreign trade company Mineralimpex concluded a contract with Soyuzneftexport providing for crude oil shipments of 120,000 barrels per day, 5 percent more than planned for 1974. This amount, which is below the 130,000 barrels per day the Soviets had earlier promised, may be raised when the inter-governmental agreement is signed. The contract also calls for shipments of 16,000 barrels per day of petroleum products, compared with 12,000 planned for 1974.

A recent agreement between the Czechoslovak foreign trade company Chemapol and Soyuzneftexport calls for Soviet oil deliveries of 310,000 barrels per day of crude oil and more than 7,000 barrels per day of petroleum products, an 8.4-percent increase over 1974. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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